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Concerned that deflationary theories of truth threaten his scientific realism, Philip Kitcher 
has constructed an argument that scientific success establishes not only the truth of 
crucial scientific beliefs but also their correspondence truth. This paper interprets and 
evaluates Kitcher’s argument, ultimately finding it to be both unsound and unmotivated. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
There are two traditions of arguments from success to truth.  One tradition is 
concerned with the nature of truth and concludes that some successful actions cannot be 
fully explained without attributing correspondence-true beliefs to the successful agents.  
This conclusion is taken to refute deflationary theories of truth by locating an explanatory 
role for correspondence.  The other tradition is concerned with whether or not certain 
beliefs are true, and concludes that scientific success establishes the truth of crucial 
scientific beliefs.  Arguments in this tradition often subsume their conclusions under the 
banner ‘realism’, and they often take scientific success to establish various and sundry 
other claims falling under that banner.1   
Philip Kitcher has combined these traditions with a hybrid argument that goes 
roughly as follows.  Some successful actions can be explained by attributing deflationary 
truth to the beliefs on which they are based.  These explanations can be extended if the 
beliefs are crucial to successful science.  The best versions of these extensions attribute 
correspondence truth.  Hence these beliefs are correspondence-true: a conclusion which 
entails the realist claim that these beliefs are true, while also refuting any deflationary 
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understanding of the nature of their truth. 2   
This paper summarizes the requisite theoretical background, reconstructs Kitcher’s 
argument, defends deflationism from that argument, articulates a related but genuine 
problem for deflationism, and critiques Kitcher’s view that deflationism threatens his 
realism.   
 
2. Theoretical Background 
 
Kitcher’s correspondence theory of truth has it that beliefs are true only if the names 
that occur in them refer, in virtue of some causal relationship, to entities that exist 
independently of the believers.3  Deflationists reject Kitcher’s conditions of independent 
existence and causal reference; on their theories, everything to be known about truth 
comes from the T-schema <‘P’ is true iff P> and everything to be known about reference 
comes from the R-schema <‘a’ refers to a, if a exists>.  These deflationary themes have 
been developed in many different ways, but the differences between these developments 
can be ignored for our present purposes.   
Kitcher’s motivation for rebuffing deflationism is that he thinks it threatens his 
realism.  The tenets of his realism are that crucial scientific beliefs are true, that these 
beliefs successfully refer, sometimes to unobservable entities, and that these entities exist 
independently of the people who hold the beliefs.4   
We need just one more bit of background: Horwich’s standard deflationist reply to 
the traditional correspondence success argument.5  This reply consists in constructing 
deflationary explanations of those successes which the traditional argument finds to be 
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explainable only with correspondence truth.  Consider Ophelia (‘O’):   
  
(1) O wants <O gets to the brook>. 
(2) O believes <O follows the path past the willows → O gets to the brook>. 
(3) [O wants <O gets to the brook> & O believes <O follows the path past the 
willows → O gets to the brook>] → O follows the path past the willows. 
(4) O follows the path past the willows. 
(5) O’s belief is true. 
(6) <O follows the path past the willows → O gets to the brook> is true. 
(7) <O follows the path past the willows → O gets to the brook> is true iff O 
follows the path past the willows → O gets to the brook. 
(8) O follows the path past the willows → O gets to the brook. 
(9) O gets to the brook. 
 
So goes Horwich’s explanation of Ophelia’s success.  Importantly, this explanation 
makes no appeal to correspondence.  Following Horwich, deflationists standardly reject 
the traditional correspondence success argument on the grounds that similar explanations 
cover all the successes in question.   
 
3. Kitcher’s Argument 
 
Kitcher’s hybrid success argument is supposed to be immune to Horwich’s 
standard deflationist reply.  The argument is difficult to interpret; I think it is supposed to 
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go as follows.   
Consider a subset (‘S’) of Horwich’s explananda: successes based on beliefs that 
are crucial to systematically successful map-based science.  The first premise, then, is 
 
(I) Horwich’s explanations of the elements of S can be extended by 
explaining some of their premises. 
 
For example, suppose Ophelia used a map.  The explanation of (2), then, is this: 
 
(a) O competently reads the map and believes <the map is accurate>. 
(b) The map has a line joining points labeled ‘castle’, ‘willows’, and ‘brook’. 
(c) Any competent reader of the map who sees a line joining three of its points 
‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’ will believe <the map is accurate → there is a path joining 
A, B, C>. 
(d) O believes <the map is accurate → there is a path joining the castle, the 
willows, and the brook>. 
(e) O believes <there is a path joining the castle, the willows, and the brook>. 
(f) O believes <there is a path joining the castle, the willows, and the brook> → 
O believes <O follows the path past the willows → O gets to the brook>. 
(2)  O believes <O follows the path past the willows → O gets to the brook>. 
 
And there is also a correspondence-based explanation of (3).  Before allowing Kitcher to 
articulate that explanation, the deflationist might interject by pointing to the fact that he 
 5 
too can explain (3), for instance in terms of some principle of practical syllogism.  And 
since none of the claims (a) – (f) appeal to any notion of correspondence, the deflationist 
can adopt them as well.  Combining his practical-syllogistic explanation of (3) with an 
assimilation of Kitcher’s explanation of (2), the deflationist would claim that the resulting 
extended version of Horwich’s explanation is at least as good as Kitcher’s own.   
But Kitcher has a ready reply: the resulting extended explanation is inferior 
because it leaves the deflationist ‘beguiled’ by vocabulary, blind towards a certain 
mystery and lacking the resources to solve it.  By using the same words to describe 
Ophelia’s world and her propositional attitudes, Kitcher says, the deflationist renders it 
mysterious why the action issued by Ophelia’s practical syllogism makes her succeed.  
Only by removing the beguilement can the deflationist solve the mystery, and there are 
just two ways for him to remove the beguilement.  One is to produce a derivation of 
 
(3'):  [(O wants <D> & O believes <B>)] → O follows the path past the willows.   
 
The other is to produce a derivation of  
 
(3'') [O wants <O gets to the brook> & O believes <O follows the path past the 
willows → O gets to the brook>] → O does some action A such that A(q),  
 
where (q) is fulfilled by any action that gets Ophelia to the brook.  But, Kitcher tells us, 
the deflationist lacks the resources to derive (3') or (3''), because no principle of practical 
syllogism entails such schematic statements. 
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Kitcher also tells us that the mystery disappears with the introduction a 
correspondence explanation of (3), which goes roughly as follows.  Looking at the map 
brings certain tokens to Ophelia’s mind.  Much to her advantage, the etiological 
relationships between these tokens, the map, and the world are of just the right sort to 
make the tokens refer to the willows, the brook, and the path.  Ophelia uses the map to 
make a plan for action.  And, since the tokens in her beliefs bear the right etiological 
relationships to the path and the willows, the action that she plans on the basis of those 
beliefs turns out to be just that action that is following the path past the willows.   
Thus, Kitcher argues, the correspondence theorist can unmysteriously explain (3).  
His extended explanation of Ophelia’s success is constituted by the attachment of this 
explanation of (3) and the explanation of (2) to Horwich’s original.  Hence 
 
(II) The extended explanations invoke correspondence truth. 
 
And the deflationist’s alternative extended explanation has additional problems over and 
above its mysteriousness.  For even if he managed to solve the mystery, the deflationist 
would still be merely giving a recipe for explaining successes like Ophelia’s one by one, 
each on its own terms.  He would not by offering this recipe locate any common property 
that unifies the distinct truth-based successful actions to which the recipe is supposed to 
apply.  But correspondence extensions of Horwich’s explanations do unify these 
explananda, Kitcher tells us, because by attributing correspondence truth to distinct 
beliefs they identify a shared etiological structure.  So, because of their relative 
mysteriousness and failure to unify, 
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(III) No deflationary extensions are as good as the correspondence extensions. 
 
On the assumption that Horwich’s explanations are at least our second best, then, our best 
explanations of the elements of S attribute correspondence truth to crucial scientific 
beliefs.  Kitcher’s argument thus works at once for the realist thesis that these beliefs are 
true and against any deflationary theory of the nature of their truth. 
 
4. Deflationism Defended 
 
So much for interpreting the argument.  The deflationist can, I think, give a 
straightforward reply.  First of all, he can solve the so-called mystery, and he can do so 
on Kitcher’s own terms.  This solution starts with something Horwich has already given 
us: 
 
(8) O follows the path past the willows → O gets to the brook. 
 
Combined with the definition of (q), this yields 
 
(g)  (q) is fulfilled by O’s following the path past the willows. 
 
Which, in conjunction with (3), entails 
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(3'') (O wants <O gets to the brook> & O believes <O follows the path past the 
willows → O gets to the brook>) → O does some action A such that A(q). 
 
The derivation of which is, by Kitcher’s own lights, sufficient for solving the mystery.   
So the deflationist’s actual extension of Horwich’s explanation consists in a 
deflationary reading of Kitcher’s derivation of (2), a derivation of (3) from a principle of 
practical syllogism, and the foregoing solution of the mystery.  The only task remaining 
for the deflationist in answering Kitcher’s hybrid argument, then, is to address the point 
about unification.  And, indeed, the deflationist has the resources to do so.   
These resources stem from the fact that the elements of S form a special case in which 
the deflationary recipe calls for extra ingredients.  The deflationary extension of 
Horwich’s general recipe with respect to S attributes to each agent a belief concerning the 
map.  In our example, the relevant belief is that the map is accurate and shows a line 
joining ‘castle’, ‘willows’, and ‘brook’.  If other people succeeded in getting from the 
castle to the brook by using the map, then the extended deflationary explanations of those 
successes would unify them with the following property:  the agents’ having the belief 
that the map is accurate and shows a line joining ‘castle’, ‘willows’, and ‘brook’.  While 
Kitcher unifies the successes in S by attributing the same etiological structure to the 
agents’ beliefs, the deflationist unifies these successes by attributing the same beliefs to 
the agents.  Thus the deflationist can provide extended versions of Horwich’s 
explanations that are  unificatory as well as unmysterious.  Kitcher’s hybrid argument is 
unsound because its third premise is false.   
 9 
 
5. A Genuine Problem 
 
Deflationism stands defended.  But perhaps the defense fails to meet the spirit of 
Kitcher’s demands.  In this section I’ll consider a way in which this might be so. 
Our deflationist is working on a tight budget, and he may have written a rubber 
check.  If the belief attributions on which his unification relies are to be defensible they 
will need to be supported by a theory of content, i.e. a theory of what individuates belief 
types.  And the production of such a theory may well require resources beyond his 
means.  This difficulty is pressed by one of the strands of the traditional correspondence 
success argument.   
That strand, which is largely due to Hartry Field, goes roughly as follows.6  Some 
successes are based on true beliefs.  Explanations of these successes attribute beliefs to 
the successful agents.  These belief attributions need support from theories of content.  
Correspondence theorists can answer this charge with theories on which the content of 
any belief is determined by its etiology.  Such answers are not open to the deflationist, 
because by giving them he would, in fact if not in name, attribute correspondence truth 
conditions to the agent’s beliefs.  Thus deflationists have a genuine problem: to produce 
theories of content that are friendly to their theories of truth. 
Here is how this strand of the traditional correspondence success argument may point 
towards something right within Kitcher’s new hybrid argument.  On its face, Kitcher’s 
derivation of Horwich’s second premise is an answer to the question ‘Why does Ophelia 
believe that if she follows the path past the willows then she gets to the brook?’  If this is 
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Kitcher’s question then, as we have seen, the deflationist can straightforwardly answer it.  
But suppose Kitcher really meant to ask ‘What about Ophelia’s belief makes it the belief 
that if she follows the path past the willows then she gets to the brook, as opposed to 
some other belief?’  If this latter question is what Kitcher really meant to ask, then our 
deflationist’s extended explanations fail to meet the spirit of his demands.  For answers to 
this latter question need support from theories of content, and our deflationist has not yet 
given a theory of content.  Moreover, Kitcher’s own explanations can be understood as 
invoking an etiological theory of content to solve the deflationist’s mystery.  Thus we can 
charitably reinterpret Kitcher as calling for a deflationist-friendly theory of content.  
Reinterpreted along these lines, Kitcher’s hybrid argument highlights an important 
issue in the standing debate between deflationists and correspondence theorists.  In 
particular, it highlights the issue of whether deflationists can produce theories of content 
that can support good explanations of successful actions that are based on true beliefs.  
But this issue existed before Kitcher’s hybrid argument and is, as far as I can see, 
dialectically unaffected by it.   
Thus far we have been focusing on the bearing of Kitcher’s hybrid argument on 
deflationary theories of truth.  But what of its bearing on his realism?  Before addressing 
that issue, we should summarize the material covered so far.  Kitcher has issued two 
challenges to the deflationist, neither of which refutes the deflationist’s view.  The first 
challenge is the claim that the deflationist hides a certain mystery.  On a face-value 
interpretation this claim is false; the deflationist passes Kitcher’s official test for 
unmysteriousness.  The claim can be reinterpreted as the thesis that deflationists cannot 
produce theories of content.  This thesis poses a genuine problem, and it can underwrite 
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Kitcher’s questions.  But it does not generate any heretofore unnoticed problems with 
which deflationists need to deal.  The second challenge is the claim that deflationists 
cannot explanatorily unify a certain class of successes.  This claim too is false; 
deflationists can unify the class with beliefs. 
 
6. Realism and the Nature of Truth 
 
Kitcher’s realist claims are that crucial scientific beliefs are true, that these beliefs 
successfully refer, sometimes to unobservable entities, and that these entities exist 
independently of the people who hold the beliefs.  Worried that some deflationists might 
accept these claims but not understand them in “the realist’s preferred sense”, he suggests 
that realists “want more than the right to attach ‘true’…in a bland and deflationary 
fashion”.7  This worry, in turn, is what motivates his argument that the success of map-
based science establishes not only the truth but the correspondence-truth of certain 
crucial scientific beliefs.   
But it is not obvious that deflationary interpretations of the truth of crucial scientific 
beliefs genuinely threaten Kitcher’s brand of realism.  At first glance, one would think 
that deflationism and the sort of realism with which Kitcher is concerned are largely 
unrelated.  Thus it is worth some effort to try to figure out why he thinks otherwise.  On 
this score I’ll consider three potential reasons for believing that Kitcher’s brand of 
realism is threatened by deflationism.     
Traditional realist success arguments take success to establish realism.  Since realist 
positions often entail the truth of crucial scientific beliefs, these arguments are often 
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taken to establish these truths.  And since realist positions also often entail the thesis that 
the referents these beliefs exist independently of the believers, these arguments are also 
often taken to establish this independence claim.  On some theories of truth (e.g. 
Kitcher’s), the truth claim entails the independence claim.  Realists who subscribe to such 
theories can jointly assert both claims by simply saying that success establishes truth.   
When deflationists accept the inference from success to truth but maintain that this 
truth is deflationary, it might seem like they have absorbed the realist success argument 
without adopting its intended conclusion about independence.  For on their theories, truth 
attributions do not entail independence claims.  Thus a first reason for realists to adopt 
correspondence theories is that those theories protect their independence claims.  This 
reason is clearly no good.  Deflationists can take success to establish truth and 
independence both, so long as they separate the two.   
This first reason is certainly too crude to be the basis of Kitcher’s own resistance to 
deflationism.  But it does set the stage for a slightly more plausible basis.  Galileo argued 
that the telescope is a reliable indicator of the truth about celestial bodies on grounds that, 
as can be independently checked, it is a reliable indicator of the truth about terrestrial 
bodies.  For since there is no relevant difference between celestial and terrestrial bodies, 
the telescope’s degree of reliability should be the same with respect to both of them.  
Kitcher has applied Galileo’s strategy to the inference rule from success to truth.  As can 
be independently checked, the success-to-truth rule is reliable with respect to theories 
about observables.  Since there is no relevant difference between theories about 
observables and theories about unobservables, then, the success-to-truth rule is reliable 
with respect to theories about unobservables as well.  Since these theories are in fact 
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successful, he concludes, crucial scientific beliefs about unobservables are true.8   
Kitcher’s correspondence theory entails that the objects to which true beliefs refer 
exist independently of the people who hold those beliefs.  Thus if his Galilean argument 
is about correspondence truth, it brings an additional realist bonus: the independence of 
unobservables.  So a second potential reason for Kitcher’s resistance is that his 
correspondence theory bolsters his realism by strengthening his Galilean argument.   
The deflationist can respond by applying the Galilean strategy to the success-to-truth 
rule and also the success-to-independence rule, which licenses independence attributions 
to the referents of successful beliefs.  Whereas Kitcher subsumes the success-to-
independence rule under the success-to-truth rule, the deflationist separates the two.  Just 
as before, the deflationist can adopt the case for independence while separating it from 
the case for truth.  The second reason does sufficiently ground the resistance. 
Where else could the resistance rest?  Deflationists can claim that scientific beliefs 
are true, that they refer (even to unobservables), and that their referents have the right sort 
of independence.  They can’t claim that the reference in question is causal.  So maybe 
Kitcher thinks that his causal theory of reference supports his realism.   
Does it?  Some arguments use the view that science has progressed over history to 
support realist claims about the science of today.  Incommensurability theses undermine 
these arguments, because if science’s stages are incommensurable, then claims of its 
progress are nonsense.  Some of Kitcher’s earlier work uses a causal theory of reference 
to defend progress arguments from this sort of objection.9  Since deflationists cannot 
appeal to causal theories of reference, this defense is threatened by their takeover.  Thus a 
third potential reason for Kitcher’s resistance to deflationism is that his causal theory of 
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reference supports his defense of progress arguments from incommensurability 
objections. 
But it is far from clear that the causal theory is necessary for this task.  And by no 
means do progress arguments exhaust Kitcher’s realist resources.  Indeed, the vast 
success of current science may well establish that realism its own.  Besides, that realism 
is obvious enough to not require an argument, at least insofar as it is concerns 
observables.  Otherwise it is more contentious, but still independent of deflationism.   
The third reason, like the first two, fails to sufficiently ground the resistance.  Unable 
to think of any additional reasons, I conclude that deflationary theories of truth are no 
threat to Kitcher’s realism.  His hybrid success argument, then, is unmotivated as well as 
unsound.10 
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